I would like to pose a set of fundamental questions regarding the
constraints we can place on the structure of our
concepts, particularly  as revealed through  language. I will outline
a
methodology for the construction of ontological
types based on the dual concerns of capturing linguistic
generalizations
and satisfying metaphysical considerations.
 I discuss what ``kinds of things'' there are,  as reflected in the
 models
of semantics we adopt for our linguistic
theories.  I argue that the flat and relatively homogeneous typing
models
coming out of classic Montague Grammar are
grossly inadequate to the task of modelling and describing language
and its
meaning.  I outline aspects of a semantic
theory (Generative Lexicon) employing a ranking of types. I
distinguish
first between natural (simple) types and
functional types, and then motivate the use of complex types (dot
objects)
to model objects with multiple and
interdependent denotations. This approach will be called the
Principle
of Type Ordering.
 I will explore what the top   lattice structures are within this
 model,
and how these constructions relate to  more
classic issues in syntactic mapping from meaning.