First-order logic

- First-order logic (FOL) models the world in terms of
 - Objects, which are things with individual identities
 - Properties of objects that distinguish them from other objects
 - Relations that hold among sets of objects
 - **Functions**, which are a subset of relations where there is only one "value" for any given "input"
- Examples:
 - Objects: Students, lectures, companies, cars ...
 - Relations: Brother-of, bigger-than, outside, part-of, has-color, occurs-after, owns, visits, precedes, ...
 - Properties: blue, oval, even, large, ...
 - Functions: father-of, best-friend, second-half, one-more-than ...

Syntax of FOL

S := <Sentence> ; <Sentence> := <AtomicSentence> <Sentence> <Connective> <Sentence> | <Quantifier> <Variable>,... <Sentence> "NOT" <Sentence> | "(" <Sentence> ")"; <AtomicSentence> := <Predicate> "(" <Term>, ... ")" | <Term> "=" <Term>; <Term> := <Function> "(" <Term>, ... ")" | <Constant> | <Variable>; <Connective> := "AND" | "OR" | "IMPLIES" | "EQUIVALENT"; <Quantifier> := "EXISTS" | "FORALL" ; <Constant> := "A" | "X1" | "John" | ... ; <Variable> := "a" | "x" | "s" | ...; <Predicate> := "Before" | "HasColor" | "Raining" | ... ; <Function> := "Mother" | "LeftLegOf" | ...;

Constants, Functions, Predicates

- Constant symbols, which represent individuals in the world
 - Mary
 - 3
 - Green
- Function symbols, which map individuals to individuals
 - father-of(Mary) = John
 - $-\operatorname{color-of}(\operatorname{Sky}) = \operatorname{Blue}$
- Predicate symbols, which map individuals to truth values
 - -greater(5,3)
 - green(Grass)
 - color(Grass, Green)

Variables, Connectives, Quantifiers

- Variable symbols
 - -E.g., x, y, foo
- Connectives
 - Same as in PL: not (¬), and (∧), or (∨), implies (→), if and only if (biconditional ↔)
- Quantifiers
 - Universal $\forall x$ or (Ax)
 - Existential **3**x or (Ex)

Quantifiers

- Universal quantification
 - $-(\forall x)P(x)$ means that P holds for **all** values of x in the domain associated with that variable
 - -E.g., ($\forall x$) dolphin(x) \rightarrow mammal(x)
- Existential quantification
 - $-(\exists x)P(x)$ means that P holds for **some** value of x in the domain associated with that variable
 - -E.g., ($\exists x$) mammal(x) \land lays-eggs(x)
 - Permits one to make a statement about some object without naming it

Sentences are built from terms and atoms

- A term (denoting a real-world individual) is a constant symbol, a variable symbol, or an n-place function of n terms.
 x and f(x₁, ..., x_n) are terms, where each x_i is a term.
 A term with no variables is a ground term
- An atom (which has value true or false) is either an n-place predicate of n terms, or, ¬P, PvQ, P∧Q, P→Q, P⇔Q where P and Q are atoms
- A sentence is an atom, or, if P is a sentence and x is a variable, then (∀x)P and (∃x)P are sentences
- A well-formed formula (wff) is a sentence containing no "free" variables. That is, all variables are "bound" by universal or existential quantifiers.

 $(\forall x)P(x,y)$ has x bound as a universally quantified variable, but y is free.

Translating English to FOL

Every gardener likes the sun.

- $(\forall x)$ gardener(x) \rightarrow likes(x,Sun) You can fool some of the people all of the time.
- $(\exists x)(\forall t) (person(x) \land time(t)) \rightarrow can-fool(x,t)$
- You can fool all of the people some of the time. $(\forall x)(\exists t) (person(x) \land time(t) \rightarrow can-fool(x,t)$
- All purple mushrooms are poisonous. $(\forall x) (mushroom(x) \land purple(x)) \rightarrow poisonous(x)$

No purple mushroom is poisonous.

 $\neg(\exists x) \text{ purple}(x) \land \text{ mushroom}(x) \land \text{ poisonous}(x)$ $(\forall x) (\text{mushroom}(x) \land \text{ purple}(x)) \rightarrow \neg \text{poisonous}(x)$

There are exactly two purple mushrooms.

 $\begin{aligned} (\exists x)(\exists y) \ mushroom(x) & \ purple(x) & \ mushroom(y) & \ purple(y) & \ \neg(x=y) & \\ (\forall z) \ (mushroom(z) & \ purple(z)) & \rightarrow ((x=z) \lor (y=z)) \end{aligned}$

Clinton is not tall.

¬tall(Clinton)

X is above Y if X is on directly on top of Y or there is a pile of one or more other objects directly on top of one another starting with X and ending with Y.

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(\forall x)(\forall y) above(x,y) (on(x,y) v (\exists z) (on(x,z)^{above(z,y)}))
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Quantifiers

- Universal quantifiers are often used with "implies" to form "rules":
 (∀x) student(x) → smart(x) means "All students are smart"
- Universal quantification is *rarely* used to make blanket statements about every individual in the world:

 $(\forall x)$ student $(x) \land$ smart(x) means "Everyone in the world is a student and is smart"

• Existential quantifiers are usually used with "and" to specify a list of properties about an individual:

 $(\exists x)$ student $(x) \land$ smart(x) means "There is a student who is smart"

• A common mistake is to represent this English sentence as the FOL sentence:

 $(\exists x)$ student $(x) \rightarrow$ smart(x)

- But what happens when there is a person who is not a student?

Quantifier Scope

- Switching the order of universal quantifiers does not change the meaning:
 - $(\forall x)(\forall y)P(x,y) \Rightarrow (\forall y)(\forall x) P(x,y)$
- Similarly, you can switch the order of existential quantifiers:
 - $(\exists x)(\exists y)P(x,y) \Rightarrow (\exists y)(\exists x)P(x,y)$
- Switching the order of universals and existentials *does* change meaning:
 - Everyone likes someone: $(\forall x)(\exists y)$ likes(x,y)
 - Someone is liked by everyone: $(\exists y)(\forall x)$ likes(x,y)

Connections between All and Exists

We can relate sentences involving \forall and \exists using De Morgan's laws:

 $(\forall x) \neg P(x) \Rightarrow \neg (\exists x) P(x)$ $\neg(\forall x) P \Rightarrow (\exists x) \neg P(x)$ $(\forall x) P(x) \Rightarrow \neg (\exists x) \neg P(x)$ $(\exists x) P(x) \Rightarrow \neg (\forall x) \neg P(x)$

Quantified inference rules

- Universal instantiation
 - $\forall x P(x) \therefore P(A)$
- Universal generalization $- P(A) \wedge P(B) \dots \therefore \forall x P(x)$
- Existential instantiation
 - $-\exists x P(x) \therefore P(F)$
 - ← skolem constant F
- Existential generalization
 - $P(A) \therefore \exists x P(x)$

An example from Monty Python

- FIRST VILLAGER: We have found a witch. May we burn her?
- ALL: A witch! Burn her!
- **BEDEVERE:** Why do you think she is a witch?
- SECOND VILLAGER: She turned *me* into a newt.
- **B:** A newt?
- V2 (after looking at himself for some time): I got better.
- ALL: Burn her anyway.
- B: Quiet! Quiet! There are ways of telling whether she is a witch

Monty Python cont.

- **B:** Tell me... what do you do with witches?
- ALL: Burn them!
- B: And what do you burn, apart from witches?
- V4: ...wood?
- B: So why do witches burn?
- V2 (pianissimo): because they're made of wood?
- **B:** Good.
- ALL: I see. Yes, of course.

Monty Python cont.

- B: So how can we tell if she is made of wood?
- V1: Make a bridge out of her.
- B: Ah... but can you not also make bridges out of stone?
- ALL: Yes, of course... um... er...
- **B:** Does wood sink in water?
- ALL: No, no, it floats. Throw her in the pond.
- B: Wait. Wait... tell me, what also floats on water?
- ALL: Bread? No, no no. Apples... gravy... very small rocks...
- **B:** No, no, no,

Monty Python cont.

- KING ARTHUR: A duck!
- (They all turn and look at Arthur. Bedevere looks up, very impressed.)
- **B:** Exactly. So... logically...
- V1 (beginning to pick up the thread): If she... weighs the same as a duck... she's made of wood.
- **B:** And therefore?
- ALL: A witch!

Monty Python Fallacy #1

- $\forall x \text{ witch}(x) \rightarrow \text{burns}(x)$
- $\forall x \text{ wood}(x) \rightarrow \text{burns}(x)$
- -----
- $\therefore \forall z \operatorname{witch}(x) \rightarrow \operatorname{wood}(x)$
- $p \rightarrow q$
- $r \rightarrow q$

• $p \rightarrow r$

- -----
- Fallacy: Affirming the conclusion

Monty Python Near-Fallacy #2

- wood(x) \rightarrow bridge(x)
- _____
- \therefore bridge(x) \rightarrow wood(x)
- B: Ah... but can you not also make bridges out of stone?

Monty Python Fallacy #3

- $\forall x \text{ wood}(x) \rightarrow \text{floats}(x)$
- $\forall x \text{ duck-weight } (x) \rightarrow \text{floats}(x)$
- -----
- \therefore $\forall x \text{ duck-weight}(x) \rightarrow \text{wood}(x)$
- $p \rightarrow q$
- $r \rightarrow q$
- -----
- \therefore r \rightarrow p

Monty Python Fallacy #4

- $\forall z \text{ light}(z) \rightarrow \text{wood}(z)$
- light(W)
- _____
- \therefore wood(W)

- ok.....
- witch(W) \rightarrow wood(W)
- applying universal instan.
- to fallacious conclusion #1

- wood(W)
- _____
- \therefore witch(z)

Axioms for Set Theory in FOL

- 1. The only sets are the empty set and those made by adjoining something to a set: ∀s set(s) <=> (s=EmptySet) v (∃x,r Set(r) ^ s=Adjoin(s,r))
- 2. The empty set has no elements adjoined to it: ~ $\exists x, s Adjoin(x,s) = EmptySet$
- Adjoining an element already in the set has no effect: ∀x,s Member(x,s) <=> s=Adjoin(x,s)
- 4. The only members of a set are the elements that were adjoined into it: $\forall x, s \text{ Member}(x, s) \iff \exists y, r (s=Adjoin(y, r) \land (x=y \lor \text{Member}(x, r)))$
- 5. A set is a subset of another iff all of the 1st set's members are members of the 2nd:
 ∀s,r Subset(s,r) <=> (∀x Member(x,s) => Member(x,r))
- 6. Two sets are equal iff each is a subset of the other: ∀s,r (s=r) <=> (subset(s,r) ^ subset(r,s))
- 7. Intersection
 - $\forall x,s1,s2 \text{ member}(X,intersection(S1,S2)) \leq member(X,s1) \land member(X,s2)$
- 8. Union
 - $\exists x,s1,s2 \text{ member}(X,union(s1,s2)) \leq member(X,s1) \lor member(X,s2)$

Axioms, definitions and theorems

- •Axioms are facts and rules that attempt to capture all of the (important) facts and concepts about a domain; axioms can be used to prove theorems
- -Mathematicians don't want any unnecessary (dependent) axioms -ones that can be derived from other axioms
- -Dependent axioms can make reasoning faster, however
- -Choosing a good set of axioms for a domain is a kind of design problem
- •A definition of a predicate is of the form "p(X) _ ..." and can be decomposed into two parts
- -Necessary description: " $p(x) \rightarrow \dots$ "
- -Sufficient description " $p(x) \leftarrow \dots$ "
- -Some concepts don't have complete definitions (e.g., person(x))

Extensions to FOL

- Higher-order logic
 - Quantify over relations
- Representing functions with the lambda operator (λ)
- Expressing uniqueness $\exists!, \iota$
- Sorted logic

Higher-order logic

- In FOL, variables can only range over objects
- HOL allows us to quantify over relations
- More expressive, but undecidable
- Example:
 - "two functions are equal iff they produce the same value for all arguments"
 - $\forall f \forall g (f = g) \Rightarrow (\forall x f(x) = g(x))$
- Example:

 $\forall r \text{ transitive}(r) \Rightarrow (\forall x \forall y \forall z r(x,y) \land r(y,z) \rightarrow r(x,z))$

Expressing uniqueness

- Sometimes we want to say that there is a single, unique object that satisfies a certain condition
- "There exists a unique x such that king(x) is true"
 - $\exists x \operatorname{king}(x) \land \forall y \operatorname{(king}(y) \Rightarrow x=y)$
 - $\exists x \operatorname{king}(x) \land \operatorname{not}(\exists y \operatorname{(king}(y) \land x \neq y)$
 - $-\exists!x king(x)$
- "Every country has exactly one ruler"
 - $\forall c \text{ country}(c) \Rightarrow \exists !r \text{ ruler}(c,r)$
- Iota operator: "t x P(x)" means "the unique x such that p(x) is true"
 - "The unique ruler of Freedonia is dead"
 - dead(\u00ed x ruler(freedonia,x))

Notational differences

- Different symbols for and, or, not, implies, ...
 - $\mathbf{F} \mathbf{A} \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{F} \mathbf{V} \neg \bullet \supset$ $p v (q^{\wedge} r)$ $p + (q^{*} r)$
 - etc

• Prolog

cat(X) :- furry(X), meows (X), has(X, claws)

• Lispy notations

(forall ?x (implies (and (furry ?x) (meows ?x) (has ?x claws)) (cat ?x)))